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Secrecy Outage Analysis for Alamouti Space-Time
Block Coded Non-orthogonal Multiple Access
Meiling Li, Hu Yuan, Xinwei Yue, Sami Muhaidat, Carsten Maple and Mehrdad Dianati
Abstract—This letter proposed a novel transmission technique
for physical layer security by applying the Alamouti Space-
Time Block Coded Non-orthogonal Multiple Access (STBC-
NOMA) scheme. The secure outage performance under both
perfect successive interference cancellation (pSIC) and imperfect
successive interference cancellation (ipSIC) are investigated. In
particular, novel exact and asymptotic expressions of secrecy
outage probability are derived. Numerical and theoretical results
are presented to corroborate the derived expressions and to
demonstrate the superiority of STBC-NOMA and its ability to
enhance the secrecy outage performance compared to conven-
tional NOMA.
Index Terms—Alamouti space-time block coding, Non-
orthogonal Multiple Access, Secure outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
NON-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been en-visaged as a promising technique for the next generation
wireless communication systems to realize massive connec-
tivity and higher system spectral efficiency [1]. However,
due to the broadcast nature of of radio propagation, NOMA
can be vulnerable to eavesdropping, which poses a challenge
for realizing secure wireless transmissions, which poses a
challenge to realize secure wireless transmission.
The concept of physical layer security (PLS) has attracted
the attention of the research community to secure the trans-
mission in NOMA systems. The authors of [2] investigated
the secrecy outage behavior of single antenna and multiple
antenna transmission scenarios for NOMA networks. The au-
thors in [3] investigated the performance of a secure NOMA-
enabled mobile edge computing network, where the optimal
secrecy offloading rate and power allocation were analyzed
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and presented in closed-form expressions. However, the per-
fect successive interference cancellation (pSIC) scheme is
conducted at legitimate users (LUs) and eavesdroppers (Eves)
in the aforementioned articles. This assumption overestimates
users detection capability and resulted in the performance
deviation. Relaxing this assumption, the authors in [4] inves-
tigated the impact of physical layer secrecy on the perfor-
mance of a NOMA system, where the imperfect successive
interference cancellation (ipSIC) was considered. The authors
in [5] studied the secrecy outage behaviours of multiple-input-
multiple-output (MIMO) NOMA, assuming max-min transmit
antenna selection. In [6], the authors optimised transmission
power by taking into account both the bounded CSI error and
Gaussion CSI error models. The authors further considered an
artificial noise scheme to improve the secure performance of
the considered network [7].
To exploit the spectral efficiency, a downlink coordinated
two-point NOMA system has been discussed in [8] by utiliz-
ing Alamouti space-time block coding (STBC). In [9], the
authors proposed a two-phase NOMA cooperative relaying
scheme in which Alamouti STBC was employed. Closed-form
expressions for outage probability and ergodic sum capacity
were derived over Rayleigh fading channels. In [10], [11], the
authors combined NOMA with Alamouti STBC to improve
system diversity order of NOMA systems.
To the best knowledge of the authors, the secrecy per-
formance of STBC-NOMA has not been investigated in the
literature. Moreover, the majority work of NOMA assumed
pSIC, which is not sensible in practice. Motivated by this, we
investigate the secrecy outage performance of STBC-NOMA
over Rayleigh fading channels. Specifically, we derive exact
and asymptotic expressions for secrecy outage probability
(SOP) of all legitimate users with both pSIC and ipSIC. It
can be deduced that the secrecy outage performance can be
obviously improved by STBC-NOMA and the diversity order
of 2l is achieved under pSIC case. However, a zero diversity
order is under ipSIC case due to the imperfect interference
cancelling which results the error floor.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows. The
system model is presented in Section II. The security outage
performance is analysed in Section III. Section IV presents the
simulation and numerical results. Finally, conclusions is given
in Section V with further discussions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a downlink NOMA system consisting of L LUs
and one Eve with single antenna. The base station (BS)
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transmit superimposed symbols over two transmit antenna
using the Alamouti code [11]. NOMA requires the knowl-
edge of all LUs, and the condition that LUs have different
channels conditions [2]. Let P , kl, and al denote the transmit
power of the BS, information symbol, and power allocation
factor of the l-th sorted LU, respectively. The power allo-
cation factors are defined as a1 > a2 > ... > aL and∑L
i=1
√
ai = 1. The received signals at user l from the BS
is rl = ‖hl‖2F
∑i=1
L ki
√
aiP/2 + nl, hl = [hS1Ul , hS2Ul ]
T
are the Rayleigh channel gains from the BS to l-th LU,
which is a vector from two antennas to achieve transmitting
diversity, where hSiUl ∼ CN (0, λ0) , i ∈ {1, 2} and sorted
in ascending order as ‖h1‖2F ≤ ‖h2‖2F ≤ · · · ≤ ‖hL‖2F [4].
The notation ||.||2F denotes the Frobenius norm of a vector
and nl ∼ CN (0, 1) is the equivalent normalized additive
Gaussion noise. The assumption is that the channel gains of
LUs and Eve are independent identical distributed. Note that
hI = [hS1UlI , h
S2Ul
I ]
T denotes the residual interference where
hSiUlI ∼ CN (0, λI) , i ∈ {1, 2}.
Following the principle of NOMA, we consider the l-th
(l > 1) LU utilises ipSIC to decode its own signal by treating
stronger users as interference. Here, we assume ipSIC case
that the interference introduced by the ipSIC implementation
being considered into the analysis. Let w = 0 and w 6= 0
represent the pSIC and ipSIC operations in the following
sections, respectively. The instantaneous signal-to-interference
plus noise ratio (SINR) of the l-th LU (l < L) can be
expressed as1:
γl =
ρal||hl||2F∑L
k=l+1 akρ||hl||2F + wρ||hI ||2F + 1
, (1)
where ρ = P/2.
The SINR of the first user (LU1) and L-th user (LUL) can
be written as :
γ1 =
ρa1||h1||2F∑L
k=2 akρ||h1||2F + 1
, γL =
ρaL||hL||2F
ωρ||hI ||2F + 1
. (2)
Similarly, Eve will receive the same signal as the LUs via
eavesdropping link. The equivalent received signal at the Eve
is rE = ‖hE‖2F
∑i=1
L ki
√
aiP/2 + nE , where the entries of
hE = [hS1E , hS2E ]
T represent the channel gains from the
BS to Eve with hSiE ∼ CN (0, λe) , i ∈ {1, 2}, and nE ∼
CN (0,Ωe) is the channel noise in the eavesdropping link.
When achieved SINR at Eve is below a threshold, Eve is not
able to recover the source signal so the transmission can be
regarded as relatively secure. Then, with the ipSIC assumption
the SINR at Eve to detect the symbol of LUl can be expressed
as:
γEl =
ρeal||he||2F
L∑
k=l+1
akρe||he||2F + wρe||hIe||2F + 1
,
(3)
where 1 < l < L, ρe = P/2Ωe, The entries of hIe =
[hS1EI , h
S2E
I ]
T are the channel gains from the BS to Eve with
1Notations: Vectors and matrices are represented by boldface lower case
letters and boldface capital letters, respectively, and [·]T represents the
conjugate transposition.
hSiEI ∼ CN (0, λIe) , i ∈ {1, 2}. When l = 1 and l = L, the
SINRs are:
γE1 =
ρea1||he||2F∑L
k=2 akρe||he||2F + 1
, γEL =
ρeaL||he|||2F
wρe||hIe||2F + 1
. (4)
It is noted that, we assume that the messages of l − 1 user
have already been decoded before the eavesdropper tries to
decode the message of l − th user. Similar assumptions can
be found in [4]. Obviously, the assumption overestimates the
capability of eavesdropper and is pessimistic, then the results
presented in this letter will be a lower bound of practical cases.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we focus on the SOP as a secrecy perfor-
mance metric [4]. The event of secrecy outage is defined as
that the secrecy capacity of the l-th user is less than the target
secrecy rate Rl, log2(1 +γl)− log2(1 + γEl) < Rl. When the
channel capacity of user l is larger than the channel capacity
of the Eve over Rl, the transmission from BS to user l can
be considered secure [12], [13]. The exact and asymptotic
expressions of SOP for both pSIC (ω = 0) and ipSIC (ω 6= 0)
STBC-NOMA are presented as well.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
Proposition 1. For the l-th user, the exact SOP can be
expressed as
Pout,l =
1
(λIλIeλe)
2Ql Ξ
i,m,n
[
(λ0ρ)
−n
Ep (∆l)
]
. (5)
where Ql = L!/(L − l)!(l − 1)!, Ξ
i,m,n
(∆) =∑L−l
i=0
(−1)i(L−li )
l+i
∑l+i
m=0
(
l+i
m
)
(−1)m∑mn=0 (mn)∆ and ∆l is
the transfer function defined as (A.4).
Proof. The secrecy rate of the l-th LU is defined as [4]
Cl = max{0, [log2 (1 + γl)− log2 (1 + γEl)−Rl]}. Given a
secrecy rate threshold Rl, the SOP of LUl can be written as:
Pout,l = Pr
{
1 + γl ≤ 2Rl (1 + γEl)
}
=
∫ ∞
0
Fγl
(
2Rl (1 + x)− 1) fγEl (x)dx, (6)
where FX(·) and fX(·) denote the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF), re-
spectively. The details of Fγl (·) and fγEl (·) are explained in
Appendix A.
Fγl (ξ) =
Ql
λ2I
Ξ
i,m,n
{
exp
(
−mδl (ξ)
λ0ρ
)(
δl (ξ)
λ0ρ
)n
× Ep
[(
λ0λI
λImwδl(ξ) + λ0
)p+2]}
,
(7)
where ξ < alεl , εl =
∑L
k=l+1 ak, ε0 = 1 for l = 1. It is noted
that when l = 1, w = 0 and p = 0. δl (ξ) = ξal−εlξ , 1 < l < L,
δL (ξ) =
ξ
aL
, and Ep(x) =
n∑
p=0
(
n
p
)
(wρ)
p
(p+ 1)!(x), and
fγEl (ξ) = =l (ξ)
exp
(
− 1λeρe δl (ξ)
)
λ2Ieλ
2
e
, (8)
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where =l (ξ) is a transfer function defined in (A.3).
By substituting (7) and (8) into (6), the SOP of LUl can be
obtained as (5).
Remark 1. When l < L, the Gaussion-Chebshev approxi-
mation can be utilized to get the result further, (6) can be
calculated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The exact SOP when l < L.
Pout,l =
Api
2U
U∑
u=1
S(u)G
(A(τu + 1)
2
)
+ F (A) , (9)
where U is a parameter to ensure a complexity-accuracy
tradeoff S(u) = √1− τu2 and τu = cos
(
2u−1
2U pi
)
.
Proof. When l < L the SOP can be directly obtained from
(6) as:
Pout,l =
∫ A
0
Fγl [B(x)] fγEl (x) dx+ F (A) , (10)
where A = εl−1εlθl − 1, B(x) = θl − 1 + θlx, θl = 2Rl and
F (x) = 1 − FγEl (x). Let G (x) = Fγl [B(x)] fγEl (x), then
(10) can be expressed as (9).
Remark 2. For l = L, which means that LUL has been
allocated the smallest transmission power. It will not suffer
from other stronger user’s interference when decoding the
signal of itself, which make the CDF of γL and PDF of γEL
are different with that of γl in (7) and (8).
Lemma 2. The exact SOP when l = L. The approximation
of ∆L in (5) can be written as follows:
∆L ≈
V∑
v=1
ωvf (ξv) . (11)
The SOP expression of LUL can be easily obtained by
substituting (11) into (5).
Proof. In order to obtain the exact value of ∆L from
(A.4), the Gauss-Laguerre quadrature of
∫∞
0
f (x) e−xdx ≈
V∑
v=1
ωvf (xv) [14] can be used to get the approximation result
of (A.4) when l = L, where, the weight of ωv and points of
xv can be obtained from [14]. Therefore, in order to utilise
the Gauss-Laguerre quadrature, based on (A.4)
f(ξ) = [δLB(ξ)]n=L (ξ)
(
λ0λl
λlmωδLB(ξ) + λ0
)p+2
× exp
(
ξ − mδLB(ξ)
λ0ρ
+
δL
λeρe
) (12)
Then, the approximation result of ∆L can be obtained from
the Gauss-Laguerre quadrature.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
In this section, the asymptotic secrecy outage performance
of STBC-NOMA is investigated to gain more insights into
the system performance in the high SNR regime. The asymp-
totic performance is investigated as the SNR of the channels
between the BS and LUs are sufficiently high, i.e., (ρ → ∞)
and the SNR of the channel between the BS and Eve maintain
arbitrary value of ρe. And the secrecy diversity order can be
expressed as d = − lim log(P
∞
out,l(ρ))
log ρ .
Lemma 3. Asymptotic SOP of the l-th (1 < l < L) user.
The asymptotic expression of the SOP of LUL is:
P∞out,l =
Api
2Uεlθl
U∑
u=1
S(u)G∞
(
(A+ 1) τu
2εlθ − l
)
+ F
( A
εlθl
)
.
(13)
Proof. According to (7), when the transmit ρ → ∞, the
asymptotic expression of Fγl can be written as follows:
F∞γl (ξ) =
Ql
λ2I
Ξ
i,m,n
{(
1− mδl (ξ)
λ0ρ
)(
δl (ξ)
λ0ρ
)n
× Ep
[(
λ0λI
λImwδl(ξ) + λ0
)p+2]}
,
(14)
Then, from (9) and (14), let G∞ (x) = F∞γl [B(x)] fγEl (x),
the SOP is (13).
Lemma 4. Asymptotic SOP probability of the 1st user.
The asymptotic expression of the SOP of LU1 is:
P∞out,1 =
piC∑Uu=1 S(u)G∞ ( (τu+1)C2 )
2U
+ F (C) . (15)
Proof. According to (7), when the transmit SNR approaches
∞, the asymptotic expression of Fγ1 can be written as follows
when ξ < a1ε1 :
F∞γ1 (ξ) = Q1 Ξi,m,n
[(
δl(ξ)
λ0ρ
)n(
1− mδl(ξ)
λ0ρ
)]
. (16)
Then, the SOP asymptotic expression for LU1 can be obtained
by (15).
Lemma 5. Asymptotic SOP probability of the L-th user.
The asymptotic SOP of the L-th user can be calculated as:
P∞out,L ≈
QL
λI
2λIe
2λe
2 Ξ
i,m,n
[
(λ0ρ)
−nEp (∆∞L )
]
. (17)
Proof. Let g (ξ) =
(
1− mξλ0ρaL
)(
A
aL
)n(
aLλ0λI
mwλIA+λ0aL
)p
=L (ξ)
and ζ = 1/λeρeaL, from (A.4), when ρ → ∞, the
approximation of ∆∞L is:
∆∞L =
∫ ∞
0
exp (ξζ) g (ξ) dξ ≈ 1
ζ
V∑
v=1
ωvg (ξv), (18)
Then the SOP asymptotic expression for LUL can be
obtained by (17).
The conclusion can be easily obtained that a zero diversity
order can be achieved for the nearest user.
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Fig. 1. SOP vs transmit SNR, with λ0 = 0 dB.
Remark 3. Specially, when x → 0, F˜X (x) ≈ 12
(
x
λ0
)2
,
we can easily get the ordered CDF of LUL as FXl (x) ≈
QL
L2L
(
x
λ0
)2L
. The asymptotic SOP of LUL under SIC is:
P∞out,L =
QL
2LLλ0
2Lλ2e
2L∑
p=0
(
2L
p
)(
θL − 1
ρaL
)p(
θLρe
ρ
)2L−p
× (2L+ 1− p)!λ2−p+2Le ,
(19)
It is noted that the diversity order under pSIC case for all
users can be achieved by:
P∞out,l ∝
L−l∑
i=0
(
1
ρ
)2(l+i)
. (20)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, two LUs (L = 2)2 and one Eve are set as
an example for illustrating the numerical results. The power
allocation coefficients are set as a1 = 0.8, a2 = 0.2 and
target data rates are R1 = 0.1 bit per channel use (BPCU)
and R2 = 0.2 BPCU for two LUs. The other parameters
are U=20, V=100. Generally, the channel conditions of the
legitimate link is considered better than the eavesdropping
link. For the numerical analysis, the channel SNR of λ0 is
3 dB bigger than λe. Additionally, the condition that λ0 = λe
is analysed as a specially matched case as well. Similarly,
the self-interference channel condition is also deemed to be
worse than the legitimate link. The difference is 3 dB for
numerical analysis. It is needed to notice that the SNR of
the channel between the BS and Eve should be an arbitrary
value of ρe. Here, as an exmple to illustrate the advantages
of STBC-NOMA, ρe is set as 10 dB [2]. The conventional
Alamouti-OMA (STBC-OMA) and the conventional NOMA
(SA-NOMA) are selected to be benchmark for comparing.
2When L > 2, the numerical results of STBC-NOMA still match our
theoretical inference. In this letter, we propose to verify our algorithm of
STBC-NOMA by presenting numerical results when L = 2.
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The SOPs for pSIC (w = 0) and ipSIC (w = 1) with
different values of SNR is presented in Fig. 1. It can be seen
that the theoretical results (solid line) match the simulations
(marks) well and asymptotic curves (dash line) are tightly
convergent to those of exact results in the high SNR regime.
The SOP of U2 with ipSIC converge to an error floor and thus
gain a zero diversity order. It is also observed that the SOP of
U2 with pSIC in STBC-NOMA is superior to that of STBC-
OMA due to the SIC technique. Generally, the SOPs of users
in the STBC-NOMA are superior than SA-NOMA because
of that space time diversity can achieve the extra diversity
gain. For example, U1 provides approximately 10 dB SNR
gain compared STBC-NOMA to SA-NOMA when the SOP
value is 10−2. However, U2 can not obtain any gain under
ipSIC case. In Fig. 2, the SOPs for ipSIC factors (ω from
0 → 1) under different channel conditions are presented as
two cases. case 1: λe = λ0 the average SNR of legitimate
link equals to that of eavesdropping link; case 2: λe = λ0− 3
the average SNR of legitimate link is 3 dB less than that of
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eavesdropping link. Obviously, STBC-NOMA can enhance the
performance of SOP compared with SA-NOMA because of
the extra transmit diversity gain by STBC-NOMA. The gap
between the blue solid line and blue dot line is bigger than
it between the black lines which means that the SOP of U2
varies more obviously under case 2 than that of case 1.
Fig. 3 plots the SOPs versus power allocation coefficient of
a1, where a2 = 1−a1. It can be seen that the SOP performance
of U1 is enhanced with the increase of the power allocation
a1 from 0.6 to 0.9, which is more obvious by STBC-NOMA
compared with SA-NOMA. Secondly, the SOP of U2 will not
increase with the increase of a1. Furthermore, if the inter-
ference cannot be cancelled perfectly (ipSIC with ω = 0.5),
STBC-NOMA provides a little better SOP performance than
SA-NOMA for U2 .
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
In this letter, the secrecy outage performance (SOP) of a
STBC-NOMA network is analysed. The exact and asymptotic
expressions of SOP are derived. The numerical and simulation
results show that the STBC-NOMA generally enhances the
SOP performance compared with SA-NOMA and STBC-
OMA. It should be noted that power allocation optimization
between NOMA users with an artificial noise-aided scheme
is capable of further improving the secrecy performance of
wireless networks, which appears to be promising future
research.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF OUTAGE PROBABILITY FUNCTION
Let Xl = ‖hl‖2F , ψ = ‖hI‖2F , ψe = ‖hIe‖2F , Y =
‖he‖2F Then the CDF and PDF of unordered form of Xl
is F˜X (x) = 1 − exp
(
− xλ0
)∑1
i=0
(
x
λ0
)i
1
i! and f˜X (x) =
x
λ20
e
− xλ0 , respectively. The CDF of ordered Xl is FXl (x) =
Ql
∑L−l
i=0
(−1)i(L−li )
l+i
(
F˜X (x)
)l+i
. By using binomial expan-
sion, it can be calculated as:
FXl (x) =Ql
L−l∑
i=0
(−1)i(l+im )
l + i
l+i∑
m=0
(
L− l
i
)
(−1)m
×
m∑
n=0
(
m
n
)
xn
λn0
e−
mx
λ0 ,
(A.1)
where Ql = L!/(L − l)!(l − 1)!. Let Ξ
i,m,n
(∆) =∑L−l
i=0
(−1)i(L−li )
l+i
∑l+i
m=0
(
l+i
m
)
(−1)m∑mn=0 (mn)∆, based on
(1), the CDF of Fγl can be easily obtained and is shown in
(7).
Similarly, the CDF of γEl is:
FγEl (ξ) =
∫ ∞
0
FY
(
(1 + wρeϕ) ξ
ρe (al − εlξ)
)
fψe (ϕ) dϕ
=
1
2λIe
− e
− δl(ξ)λeρe
λIe
2
[(
1 +
1
λeρe
δl (ξ)
)(
w
λe
δl (ξ) +
1
λIe
)-2
+
2wδl (ξ)
λe
(
w
λe
δl (ξ) +
1
λIe
)-3]
,
(A.2)
where ξ < alεl . Then, from (A.2), the PDF of FγEl as shown
in (8), where,
=l (ξ) = δl′ (ξ)
(
λeλIe
ωλIeδL(ξ) + λe
)2 [
δl (ξ)
ρ2e
+
2w
ρe
(1 + δl (ξ))
×
(
λeλIe
ωλIeδL(ξ) + λe
)
+ 6w2δl (ξ)
(
λeλIe
ωλIeδL(ξ) + λe
)2 ]
,
(A.3)
where δ′l(ξ) = al/(al − εlξ)2 when l < L and δ′L(ξ) = 1/aL.
By combining (6), (7) and (8), the security outage proba-
bility of LUl is shown in (5). where,
∆l =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−mδl(ξ)B(ξ)
λ0ρ
+
δl(ξ) (ξ)
λeρe
)
(δlB(ξ))n
×
(
λ0λI
λImwδlB(ξ) + λ0
)p+2
=l (ξ) dξ.
(A.4)
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